The reward of strong leadership

The reward of strong leadership

March 16, 2009-a landmark in Pakistan's history-will always be remembered as a great day for the revival of the rule of law, rejection of legacy of a military dictator, reaffirmation of people's power and demonstration of national consensus that dispensation of justice is the main pillar of democracy. The call for Long March and dharna (sit-in) till the restitution of pre-3rd November judiciary proved to be a great leap forward as the government of the day and establishment were left with no choice but to yield before the will of the people. The emergence of a new Pakistan on March 16, 2009 was, symbolically, the renewal of the spirit of Lahore Resolution of March 23, 1940-establishment of a State for the welfare of people with assurance of justice to all. If March 23, 1940 paved way for independence and separate homeland for the Muslims of sub-continent after long-drawn struggle against colonial rule, March 16, 2009 brought victory for justice-for the first time the establishment suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of masses. Interestingly, both the events originated from Lahore.

In its 62 years of existence, the State of Pakistan faced a daunting challenge of establishing a true democratic polity based on constitutional supremacy, rule of law and equity. The long military rules-backed by foreign masters-and in between the experiments of 'controlled democracy' denied the people of Pakistan their sovereign right of self-governance, for which a long struggle was waged to secure independence from the British raj. We did get a 'homeland' on August 14, 1947, but failed to make it 'free land' where the will of the people rules and their rights are respected and protected. The challenge to restore people's rule was, nonetheless, taken up by anti-establishment forces since 1947 but vested interest with the help of foreign masters foiled all their efforts-in the process we lost a part of homeland and many leaders, political workers and social activists. The dictatorial rules muzzled all the state organs-especially judiciary, that became an approving arm for many unconstitutional rules. However, the defiance that started on March 9, 2007, was a starting point and March 16, 2009, proved to be a culmination of the journey-from denial to freedom, hope for an era of independent judiciary and rule of law.

The people will now have to guard their great achievement. The events of March 15, 2009 to March 18, 2009 from the resisting and defying the naked use of power by the government to ultimate victory of masses and issuance of notification of restitution of Chief Justice of Pakistan and others, testify the valiant struggle waged by all segments of society, most notably by lawyers, media, social and political activists. These forces in future will have to act as a watchdog to ensure that judiciary plays its role within the constitutionally-defined limits and people get their rights. Judiciary should be free from all external pressures including the so-called street power to perform its duties strictly in accordance with law.

Our history is marred by anti-people and autocratic rules-both military and civilian alike - which were most of the time welcomed by the political elite. Besides various socio-politico-economic factors behind the failure to establish a sustainable democracy and responsible rule, the role of judiciary was subjected to severe criticism for validating coups d'etat. Like all others institutions and organs, judiciary in the post-independence period suffered due to weak democratic traditions, fight between economic vested interests, rivalry of influential politicians and a bitter power struggle between the landowner cliques and civil-military bureaucracy. If the press and nation rise and fall together, the same is true for judiciary. No institution or organ of the State exists or works in isolation from socio-economic and political conditions. It is thus not something unusual that during the last 62 years, judiciary also got divided on political lines when deciding important cases, especially when legitimacy of supra-constitutional takeovers disrupting the democratic process was called in question.

November 3, 2007 was a unique day when a dictator imposed judiciary-specific martial law - this time the victims were not politicians but the judges. In this backdrop, the issue of restitution of judges assumed great importance as it was to determine whether as a nation we would progress or retard. After much resistance by the Co-chairman of the ruling party and renunciations of written agreements, it was finally conceded by him that illegally removed judges, in fact, never ceased as judges. In reality, the question was not that of mere reinstatement of a few judges but restoring of status quo ante existing on November 2, 2007-undoing unlawful acts of Pervez Musharraf.

In post-March 16, 2009, scenario, the onus is on the Parliament to undo all the actions taken by Musharraf on November 3, 2007, as well as to remove all the distortions made in the Constitution of Pakistan since 1973. If fact, the time is now ripe to enter into a new social contract amongst all the federating units of Pakistan by thoroughly revisiting all the provisions of the Constitution and making them acceptable to everyone in the changed circumstances. Political consensus through deliberations and debates inside and outside the Parliament is the need of the hour. It is the only way to address the challenging issues of terrorism, regional insurgencies, poverty and growing economic inequalities.

Needless to say that the higher judiciary should also play its vital role of curtailment of arbitrary exercise of powers by any organ of the State, including itself. It must protect the fundamental rights of citizens under all circumstances as was done in a number of cases e.g Sabir Shah vs Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1994 SC 738), Mohammad Nawaz Sharif sv Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1993 SC 473), Federat ion of Pakistan vs Aftab Ahmad Sherpao (PLD 1992 SC 723), Ahmad Tariq Rahim vs Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1992 SC 646), Hakim Khan vs Government of Pakistan (PLD 1992 SC 595), Federation of Pakistan vs Mohammad Saifullah Khan (PLD 1989 SC 166) and Benazir Bhutto vs Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 416).

The critics of higher judiciary of Pakistan should also realise that it is the people's will and power that alone forces the barrel of gun to renounce unlawful rule. Nowhere in the world has this task ever been performed by the judiciary. It is basically a political question and not a legal issue. Even if judiciary declares a coup detat illegal (as was done by seven-member bench of apex court on November 3, 2007, how can it force the usurper to abdicate power? Judiciary has no power (physical) to get its order implemented by force. The responsibility for failure of political leadership in Pakistan to counter intervention of civil-military bureaucracy cannot be shifted to the judiciary. Only reliance on people's power can avert unconstitutional rule-the politicians must have learnt this lesson on March 16, 2009.

The effectiveness of people's power has been proved-historic struggle waged by the legal fraternity, supported by political parties and members of civil society has won victory for all. It was all due to masses of Pakistan that the periods from March 9, 2007 to July 20, 2007, from November 3, 2007 to March 16, 2009 have become landmarks in our legal and political history. The second restoration of the Chief Justice of Pakistan on March 22, 2009 which is not triumph for an individual but a victory for justice is a first step towards revival of true democratic rule and independence of judiciary in Pakistan.

In the wake of this historic day, it is now the duty of all political parties, intelligentsia, media and representatives of civic society to act actively and responsibly to work towards revival of true democracy and constitutional rule in the country. Instead of entering into polemics and rhetoric, they should strive to evolve a national consensus on a one-point agenda i.e. supremacy of constitution and independence of judiciary.

It is time that through national consensus and reconciliation we establish a democratic rule, which is not possible without a free and independent judiciary. Political turmoil, social unrest and violence are the direct result of undemocratic rule and lack of dispensation of justice.

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Pakistan Resolution Day

Pakistan Resolution Day
 
From United India to Pakistan Resolution



The Pakistan Resolution of 23rd March 1940 and its subsequent adoption by the Muslim League was an answer to the Congress's consistent attempts to deny the Muslim community a religio-political entity of their own. There had been a tussle for power between the Congress and League since 1937, and the crux of the issue had been whether India was a uni-cultural, bi-cultural, or multi-cultural state.

The controversy began when, on September 18, 1936, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru said: "The real contest is between two forces - the Congress which represents the will to freedom of the nation, and the British Government in India and its supporters who oppose this urge and try to suppress it. Intermediate groups, whatever virtue they may possess, fade out or line up with one of the principal forces . . . . The issue for India is that of independence. He, who is for it, must be with the Congress and if he talks in terms of communalism he is not keen on independence."

Nehru later referred to his "two-force" formula in January 10, 1937 too. This stance indicated a paradigmatic shift in the Congress's erstwhile policy. Since 1910, the Congress had always treated Jinnah as representing an influential and progressive, if not always a major, segment of Muslims. In tandem, since 1915, the Congress had always considered the Muslim League as the most authoritative Muslim body, but for over two decades now, whenever Congress negotiated the Hindu-Muslim problems, it was always with Jinnah and the Muslim League.

This unexpected change had been brought about by Nehru's desire and determination to swamp all other political parties prior to the impending provincial elections under the 1935 Act.

In a sense, Nehru's strategy did pay off immensely. The Congress scored a sweeping majority of the seats, and established its government. But Nehru's calculations went awry, and of all the Muslim seats available, the Congress won only 26. Out of these seats, 19 of them were in NWFP alone, where Abdul Ghaffar Khan had given the Congress a decisive hold.

In contrast, the League had won 112 out of 492 Muslim seats, approximately 23%, the rest going to the Unionist Party (Punjab), the Krishak Proja Party (Bengal), and some minor Muslim, regional parties. Though by no means impressive, the League's score was still the highest. More importantly, it had won seats in seven out of eleven provinces. Therefore, it alone could claim to speak on behalf of the Muslims of India.

With the Nehru Report (1928-29) and the Communal Award of 1932, attempts were made to reach some sort of understanding with regional or minor parties on a provincial basis, which met with some success. But grabbing at this chance of the provincial option's working out, the Congress started demurring at having to deal with the Muslim League and its leader, Jinnah.

Thus, Nehru's "two-force" dictum could by no means be considered a stray declaration, out of sync with mainstream Congress thinking.

Interestingly though, Jinnah's response to Nehru's onslaught was surprisingly conciliatory. Of course, he disputed the Congress's claim, in his speech at Calcutta's Mohammad Ali Park election meeting on January 4, 1937, saying: "I refuse to line up with the Congress. I refuse to accept this proposition. There is a third party in this country and that is Muslim India   . . . . We are not going to be camp followers of any party."

But at the same time, he held out the olive branch, saying "We are willing as equal partners to come to a settlement with our sister communities in the interest of India." For the next six months, when the Congress, assuming power in the provinces, seriously began to implement its 'uni-national and uni-cultured India' dictum, Jinnah reaffirmed his conciliatory stance repeatedly. Thus, in his May 21, 1937, speech at Bombay he reiterated that his idea was still to "form a progressive, independent, nationalist group to work with the Congress for the good of the country", and insisted that the Muslims "are prepared to fight for the country's freedom as equals with other parties, but never as camp followers, nor shall we submit to anybody's dictation."

The deep divergence that characterised Hindus and Muslims, the Congress and the League's style of reasoning in 1937, centred round the issues of whether Indians were uni-national or bi-national, and whether or not the country was uni-cultured or bi-cultured.

In denying the intermediate groups the right to existence and in denying "all 'third parties', middle and undecided groups" any "real importance" in the historical sense, Nehru was not only denying the Muslim League the right to exist or its due importance, but he was also denying them the right to organise themselves politically on a platform of their own, other than that of the Congress, besides ignoring their identity in India's body politics as a religio-political entity.

As opposed to this idea, Jinnah felt that India was multi-national and multi-cultural country, that the Muslims had the right to maintain their separate identity since they represented the "third party" in India's body-politics, that it should refuse to be "camp followers of any party", and that, above all, Muslims should organise themselves politically, to make the third party claim a fait accompli. As a corollary to this claim, the Quaid demanded equality of status for the Muslims and he offered to coalesce with Congress in the struggle for freedom provided the Muslims were "assured of their political freedom."

Two speeches in particular, besides the January 4, Calcutta address, indicate the trend of Jinnah's thinking. Addressing the AIML Council six weeks earlier, he had explained that it was impossible for the Muslims to merge with the Hindus because "their language, culture and civilisation are quite different". National self-government, he said, was his creed; but Muslims "must unite as a nation and then live or die as a nation".

In attempting to explain the increasing alienation of Muslims from the Congress since its ascension to power in the Hindu majority provinces in 1937, historians have generally dilated upon, and attributed it to, various Congress policies, and listed various items in its programme which forced the Muslims up the wall - and along the path of confrontation. For, these policies and programmes assumed their real significance only in the "uni-national and uni-cultured India" framework and it was only in the context of this framework that the Congress policies and the various items in its programme could fall into place.

This framework alone explains why the Congress opted for unitarianism as opposed to a Muslim federalism in the formation of ministries, why it offered "absorption" instead of "partnership"  to the Muslim League, why it called for the disbandment of Muslim League parties in the legislatures, and why it insisted upon Muslim members of the legislatures, signing the Congress pledge before being sworn in as ministers. This framework also explains why the Congress sought to impose the tri-colour flag, the Bande Mataram, Hindi and the Wardha Scheme educational system as items of national importance. This act also shed light on why the Congress tried to isolate the third major political party in India, the Muslim League, and Jinnah, its leader, by sucking in minor, but influential, parties such as the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind, the Ahrars and the Khudai Khidmatgars into its fold and mounted a mass contact campaign amongst the Muslims in collaboration with its "client" parties.

Once the Congress President denied the existence of a Hindu-Muslim problem, and the need for safeguards for Muslim religion, culture and language, the Congress was bound to initiate and implement policies and programmes that were suicidal to the concept of Muslims being a separate political entity.

Some participants in the UP ministry formation talks, such as Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (1889-1958) and Chaudhry Khaliq-uz-zaman, attribute the beginning of the Congress-League confrontation in 1937 to the breakdown of their negotiations at Lucknow. Azad also attributed the breakdown on the number of places to be given to the League nominees. In actual fact, however, the talks broke down not on the number of League nominees to be accommodated in the ministry but on Azad's refusal to include a clause in the agreement that "communal matters such as questions relating to the Communal Award, language, culture, religious observances, etc. will be outside the scope of the agreement".

Till 1937, the Muslims believed in a composite Indian nationhood and a composite nationalism, which would allow them to retain their identity. It was their cardinal belief in a Muslim identity that had led them to insist upon federalism and autonomy of the provinces in the Delhi Muslim Proposals (1927), the All Parties Muslim Conference Resolution of January 1, 1929, the Fourteen Points (1929), and in the demands put forth at the Round Table Conferences (1930-32).

The abandonment of the separate electorates' principle in Delhi Muslim Proposals caused a split in the League, and the Muslim consensus on its retention in Jinnah's Fourteen Points underscored their deep and sincere concern of keeping their political entity intact. For the first time in 1937, they realised, as a result of their bitter experiences under the Congress Raj, that even a composite nationhood in the Congress dictionary meant, very simply, majority rule.

History is a witness that majorities are apt to oppress minorities under them. Yet, even worse, in India majority meant Hindu rule, and the Hindu record of tolerance of other religious groups was not very optimistic either.

It is true that the Muslims of the Congress provinces, especially the UP Muslims, were the first to apprehend "the dangers of Hindu ascendancy under a Congress Raj" and react. But the "absorption" edict, which had serious implications on an all-India level and on a long-term basis, alarmed the Muslims living in majority provinces. For, "if the UP sample was to be the pattern of Congress's political conduct, what would be the position of Muslims when a federal government for all India was formed? There would be no room on the throne of India save for Congress' stooges", remarked Penderal Moon.

An echo of what Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817-98) had predicted some fifty years earlier when he had posed the critical query: "Is it possible that under the circumstances two nations, the Mohammedans and the Hindus, could sit on the same throne and remain in equal power was again felt across India." It was obvious to all that one would conquer the other and thrust it down. To hope that both could remain equal was to desire the impossible, and the inconceivable."

To Muslims, then, the Congress rule in the provinces, during 1937-39 portended precisely the sort of dispensation they had been trying to save themselves against since Syed Ahmed Khan's days. This eventually led to the adoption of the Pakistan Resolution which formally and unreservedly declared India as bi-national and bi-cultured.

In this instance, Jinnah argued the case for Muslim nationhood, which constituted the basis of the Pakistan demand, cogently and eloquently when he asserted, "We are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilisation, names and nomenclature, sense of values and proportion, legal laws and moral code, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitude and ambitions; in short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life. By all canons of international law we are a nation."
 

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Quaid e Azam ka tasawur e pakistanقائد اعظم کا تصور پاکستان

 Quaid e Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah (R.A) ne aik dfa fermaya tha k " Bar'r-e-Sagheer main Pakistan ki Bunyaad us waqt pr gai thi jbh pehla hindu Musalman hua tha" Go k yeh safar bohat lamba hai lekin 23 March 1940 yeh woh Azeem din hai Jbh us safar ki manzil ka taiy'yun kiya gya aur musalmnaan-e-Hind ne apna nasb-ul-ain tay kiya tha , yeh woh din hai jbh Do Qoumi Nazariye ki Bunyaad pr Qraardaad-e-Pakistan kay manzoor hone kay bad sbh Musalmanan-e-Hind ki zindgi ka wahed maqsad "le kay rahen ge Pakistan , Ban kay rahe ga Pakistan" ban gya tha , "Aik hi jazba Musalmaon ka Alag Watan Aik hi Ishq Pakistan" tha.. Aur 7 saal kay qaleel arse main Un Suche Ashiqon ne duniya kay naqshe par sbh se mazboot aur azeem Mumlakat ko Qaim kr k Duniya main lazwaal misal Qaim ki , aur aisi misalon ko tarikh kay awraq pr raqam kiya Jo duniya k lie Misaal hain aur hmare lie na sirf bais e fakhar hain.. 23 March wohi din hai jis din PAKISTAN ka Qyaam her dil ki taman'na aur her zindgi ka maqsad bna , Taman'na thi aik aise mulk ki jaga khush-hali aur aman ho ga jahan Islami nizam e zindgy Riaj ho ga ...











قائد اعظم کا تصور پاکستان





Quaid e Azam ka tasawur e pakistan kya tha?



Tariq ismail sagar

Manzar nama

23 march 2011

Pakistan day, 14 august, sayings of Quaid e azam about pakistan.

Quaid i azam's vision for pakistan

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Kya ham bach jaen gy?

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خلافت راشدہ

Khilafat e rashida
by Orya maqbool jan

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Raymond devis

Raymond devis ke saza sirf mout hai.
What ulema says about raymond devis.
statements of mufti muneeb ur rehman, Molana Ameer hamza,
moulana abdul raof farooqi, sheikh ul hadith molana zahid ur rashidi and mulana muhammad shareef hazarvi.

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Insaaf

Tota toti ore ulu ke kahani.
the story of owl and parrot to explain justice

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